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Abstract
The legality of al-ijÉrah al-mawÎËfah fÊ al-dhimmah (AIMAD) 
has been disputed. Some contemporary scholars have mentioned 
disagreement among the early Muslim scholars about it and have 
identified the ×anafÊ School’s position to be prohibition. In fact, the 
classical texts of most juristic schools are similar in terms of the 
discussion on this contract. Hence, the question that arises is whether 
there is really a dispute among the four major Sunni schools of Islamic 
law or consensus on the legality of AIMAD. In order to answer the 
question, this paper discusses the classical and contemporary fiqh 
literature on this issue. The method followed in this paper is a critical 
analytical approach. The most important finding of this paper is that 
there is actually no dispute among the scholars of the four major 
Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence over the legality of AIMAD; 
rather, they unanimously agreed on its legality. However, what was 
mentioned by some contemporary scholars is only differences in their 
approaches while dealing with the classical texts of Islamic law. The 
agreed view on AIMAD could be the basis for new innovations in 
Islamic financial institutions in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Al-ijÉrah al-mawÎËfah fÊ al-dhimmah (AIMAD) is a newly 
introduced mode of financial transaction in Islamic financial 
institutions. It is construed as a “lease contract in which the subject 
matter is a usufruct to be delivered in the future, and it is clearly 
defined in a way that there remains no potential for dispute” (al-
Qurah DÉgÊ, 2008). It is also termed as forward ijÉrah (lease). From 
the literature, it is found that there is disagreement over the legality 
of AIMAD among contemporary scholars in their reporting of the 
opinions of classical fuqahÉ (Muslim jurists). Some contemporary 
scholars have mentioned a dispute among the early Muslim scholars 
over its legality. According to this view, the majority of scholars 
from the major Sunni schools of Islamic law (MÉlikÊ, ShÉfiÑÊ, and 
×anbalī) allowed AIMAD whereas scholars of the ×anafÊ School did 
not allow it (Abū Ghuddah, 2007). On the other hand, some other 
contemporary scholars have mentioned unanimous consensus of the 
four schools, including the ×anafÊ School, on the legality of AIMAD 
(×Émid MÊrah, 2012). The question that therefore arises is whether 
the legality of AIMAD is agreed upon among the four popular Sunni 
schools of Islamic law, or is it a matter of dispute? 
It is worth mentioning that due to the unclear stance on the 
legality of AIMAD, it was not applied during the early period of 
the practice of Islamic finance, and thus it is still considered a new 
issue (Abū Ghuddah, 2007). Nonetheless, the concept of AIMAD has 
been applied in Islamic financial transactions for the last few years 
as it helps to fulfill the financial needs of those who cannot afford 
to buy their necessary commodities or services by cash payment. 
AIMAD is currently used in the Islamic banking industry as a stand-
alone contract as well as a sub-contract in hybrid transactions such 
as mushÉrakah mutanÉqiÎah partnership (MMP) for home financing. 
Therefore, it is important to verify the authenticity of AIMAD in the 
light of the classical literature in order to validate financial products 
which are structured using it. 
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Accordingly, this paper aims to study the views of both classical and 
contemporary scholars on the legality of AIMAD in order to remove 
any misconception about it. Since AIMAD is closely related to ijārah 
and salam contracts, the paper also examines the views of scholars on 
the fiqh characterization (takyÊf fiqhÊ) of AIMAD in order to determine 
its origin and to conclude which contract takes the dominant effect in 
AIMAD. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Most of the classical scholars discussed AIMAD together with ijÉrah 
muÑayyanah (specific ijÉrah/normal ijÉrah), except al-BahËtÊ (1051 
AH) and al-MinhÉjÊ (880 AH). These two scholars classified ijÉrah as 
two types (ijÉrah muÑayyanah and ijÉrah mawÎËfah) and discussed 
them separately. The majority treatment is why AIMAD was not 
highlighted as a separate contract in the first instance by Islamic 
financial institutions. 
A number of articles and research papers have been written by 
contemporary scholars in relation to the legality of AIMAD. Among 
the contemporary scholars, AbË Ghuddah (2007) was among the 
first to address the issue. He mentioned disagreements among the 
classical four Sunni schools of Islamic law and stated that the ×anafÊ 
School does not allow AIMAD, but he did not refer to any ×anafÊ 
classical text to support his stand. Some scholars like Nazih ×ammÉd 
(2007) and AÍmad NaÎÎÉr (2009) also adhered to this opinion. They 
mentioned two clauses from Majallat al-AÍkÉm al-ÑAdliyyah (clause 
449) and Murshid al-×ayrÉn (clause 580) as well as one principle 
from the ×anafÊ School. However, it appears that these texts do not 
support their standpoint; rather, they uphold the opposite view. 
On the other hand, SÉmÊ al-Suwaylem (2010), ×Émid MÊrah 
(2012) and Yūsuf al-Shubaylī (2012) held the opinion that the ×anafī 
School also allows AIMAD and that there is consensus among the 
four schools on the legality of AIMAD. However, only SÉmÊ 
al-Suwaylem (2010) directly cited classical ×anafī texts in this 
regard; while ×Émid MÊrah (2012) quoted from him. Still, none 
of them comprehensively discussed all the views of the classical 
scholars thoroughly. Mikail (2013) examined some issues relating to 
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AIMAD, but he did not discuss the legality of AIMAD in the light 
of classical literature. Therefore, this paper aims to do a survey on 
the fiqhÊ opinions of classical and contemporary scholars in order to 
conclude whether there is a dispute among the four Sunni schools 
about the legality of AIMAD. 
III. METHODOLOGY
This is library-based research; the inductive approach is employed 
to critically analyse various juristic views regarding the legality 
of AIMAD. As contemporary scholars specifically differ in their 
approaches to the classical texts of the ×anafÊ School on this issue, 
this paper will analyse their approaches. It will also examine the 
resolutions of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) to 
determine the contemporary practice of AIMAD by Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs). 
IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND POINTS OF
AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF AIMAD
a. Early Connotations of the Concept of AIMAD
Early Muslim scholars did not pay special attention to AIMAD, 
not considering it an independent contract; therefore, no specific 
definition of it can be found in the classical books. Most scholars 
simply mentioned AIMAD while discussing the conditions of the 
subject matter as to whether it is an existing item or non-existent item 
stipulated by specifications. The ×anbalÊ scholar Ibn NajjÉr al-FatËÍÊ 
(2000: 4/5) is typical in his treatment of AIMAD, saying that “the 
subject matter is either a particular existing item or stipulated by 
specifications” while giving the definition of ijÉrah in general. This 
indication can be helpful in defining AIMAD, as is his mention of the 
subject matter possibly being a liability in his definition of ijÉrah, 
which he intended to be inclusive of its various types. Al-MinhÉjÊ 
(1996) discussed AIMAD more extensively than did other classical 
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scholars, but he also did not provide any particular definition for it. 
Instead, he gave a statement which resembles a simple connotation 
of AIMAD while discussing types of ijÉrah. He said: “The mode of 
al-ijÉrah al-wÉridah ÑalÉ al-dhimmah (that is executed on liability) is 
executed by deferring the usufruct and paying the rental in advance” 
(Al-Minhājī, 1996: 2/220).         
b. Contemporary Connotations of AIMAD 
With regard to contemporary scholars, since AIMAD is a newly 
introduced mode of Islamic financing, they also appear to provide 
different definitions of it. AbË Guddah (2007) is the pioneer among 
contemporary scholars who paid attention to this mode of financing. 
Subsequently, other scholars wrote a number of papers on this 
financial instrument. Some important connotations are mentioned 
below.  
Abū Ghuddah (2007: 73) states: 
Al-ijÉrah al-mawÎËfah fÊ al-dhimmah can be defined as the 
commitment of the lessor to provide a benefit that has been 
thoroughly described (to the standards required in salam 
sales) such that potential conflict is eliminated, whether the 
subject matter is the benefit of an object, such as leasing a 
car of stipulated specifications, or a human service such as 
tailoring or teaching. 
He (2007: 73) proceeds by saying: 
It is not a condition that the lessor should possess the benefit 
at the time of contract; rather, the usufruct is attached to the 
future so that he can possess it by the promised time when the 
ijÉrah is to be executed. 
He explicitly states that this definition is synthesized from a 
number of references. It is also observed that this statement could 
be considered a connotation for AIMAD rather than a logical jÉmiÑ 
mÉniÑ (inclusive and exclusive) definition because it does not consist 
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of the essential elements of a definition—that is, jins (genus) and faÎl 
(what distinguishes it from other members of the same genus).   
Al-Qurah DÉgÊ (2008: 14) defines AIMAD as “a contract in 
which the subject matter is usufruct stipulated as a liability in such 
a way that it removes potential dispute.” In this definition, al-Qurah 
Dāgī does not mention the jins in the definition; rather he mentions a 
phrase which is more general than the jins of ijārah. In addition, he 
adds another phrase to this term which can include all the conditions 
of ijārah despite the fact that the definition should be free from 
conditions. Hence, this connotation is also not a proper definition.  
AÍmad NaÎÎÉr (2009) denotes AIMAD by different idioms such 
as “sale of future usufruct in exchange for immediate cash.” Secondly, 
it is “a salam contract on usufruct” whether the usufruct comes from 
objects or acts. Thirdly, it is “rental that entails obligation” because 
the promised usufruct is attached to the liability of the muʾajjir 
(lessor) and is not particularized. Fourthly, it is “rental executed on 
guaranteed usufruct” because the muʾajjir guarantees the usufruct 
in all situations and it is attached to his obligation. In this definition, 
AÍmad NaÎÎÉr (2009) intended to explain the nature of AIMAD. 
That is why, he mentions different terms that include some of the 
conditions of AIMAD. Moreover, he does not mention the arkÉn 
(essential elements) of AIMAD. Hence, none of these terms could be 
a jÉmiÑ mÉniÑ definition for this type of ijÉrah. 
c. The Preponderant Definition of AIMAD
Since none of these definitions given by classical and contemporary 
scholars is a jÉmiÑ mÉniÑ definition of AIMAD, there is a need to 
provide a definition of it in order to crystallize the theory of AIMAD. 
Based on the previous terms provided by scholars and the preponderant 
definition of ijÉrah in general, the concrete definition of AIMAD is:
ٍطْوُﺮُﺸِﺑ ٍضَﻮِﻌِﺑ ِﺔﱠﻣ ﱢﺬﻟا ِْﰲ ٍﺔَﻓْﻮُﺻْﻮَﻣ ٍﺔَﻌَْﻔـﻨَﻣ ُﻚْﻴِْﻠَﲤ
Transferring ownership of usufruct stipulated in the liability 
in exchange for a counter- value with conditions. 
This definition is jÉmiÑ and mÉniÑ because it identifies the genus 
to which the defined item belongs along with what distinguishes it 
from other members of the same genus. In this definition, tamlÊk 
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(transferring ownership) is the genus, which includes transfer 
of anything, whether it is an object or usufruct. In other words, it 
includes ijÉrah, sale, gift, charity, marriage, commission, muÌÉrabah 
and sharecropping, among others. ManfaÑatin (usufruct) is the first 
faÎl, which excludes transferring the ownership of objects from the 
definition; it thus excludes bayÑ (sale), hibah (gift), and charity, 
among others. MawÎËfatin fÊ al-dhimmah (stipulated in liability) is the 
second faÎl which excludes the usufruct of particular objects because 
leasing usufruct of particular objects is ijÉrah muÑayyanah (particular 
ijÉrah). The third faÎl is bi ÑiwaÌin (in exchange for) which excludes 
gifting usufruct, bequeathing it, partnership and lending, among 
others (al-ZuÍaylÊ, 1996: 2/241). The fourth faÎl is bi shurËÏ (with 
conditions) which means that the usufruct and consideration are not 
ordinary; rather, there are some conditions that must be fulfilled for 
the validity of the contract. An illustration of AIMAD is provided in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Structure of Forward IjÉrah
 
Source: Authors’ Own
1. The lessee comes to the lessor and requests a usufruct such as 
use of a house or a car, or use of a personal service, while the 
usufruct is non-existent or is existent but not possessed by the 
lessor. Hence, the lessor stipulates the usufruct with certain 
specifications and offers the usufruct.  
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2. The lessee accepts the offer and makes the payment in advance 
even though the usufruct is not determined as a specific one.
3. Once the lessor possesses the usufruct, he will deliver the usufruct 
with all the criteria stipulated.     
V. LEGALITY OF AIMAD 
a. General Evidence
Since AIMAD is a forward sale of usufruct, the general evidence for 
salam and ijÉrah is used as evidence for the legality of AIMAD. The 
scholars referred to conditions of ijÉrah and salam according to their 
points of view while discussing the takyÊf fiqhÊ1 and conditions of 
AIMAD. Scholars are in agreement on the permissibility of ijÉrah 
and salam on the basis of evidence from the QurÒÉn, the Sunnah, and 
ijmÉÑ (consensus). As for the evidence of the QurÒÉn on ijÉrah, Allah 
(SWT) says: 
“And if they suckle your [offspring], give them their 
recompense: and take mutual counsel together, according to 
what is just and reasonable” [al-ÙalÉq: 6]. 
Since the verse ordains consideration for suckling, it means that the 
contract of suckling is a form of ijÉrah. This is the literal meaning of 
the verse because suckling without contract does not necessitate any 
counter-value; rather, it is considered a donation.       
The QurÒÉn also mentions: 
One of the two women said: “Father, employ this man in 
your service. The best whom you might employ is he who is 
strong and trustworthy.” Her father said to Moses: “I want to 
1 Takyīf fiqhī means to refine a fiqhī issue which is apparently related to different legal 
codes and disputed over through identifying its fiqhī origin that is distinguished with 
the standard of reference by the legal authority. The researcher derived this definition 
from Qutub MuÎÏafÉ ØÉnË (2000: 143) and AÍmad MukhtÉr ÑAbdul ×amÊd ÑUmar 
(2008: 1978).   
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marry one of these two daughters of mine to you if you serve 
me for eight years. But if you complete ten years, that will be 
of your own accord [but not an obligation]. I do not intend to 
treat you harshly. If Allah wills, you will find me an upright 
man” [al-Qasas: 26-27]. 
Here, MËsÉ (AS) is being offered employment as a shepherd in 
exchange for a determined compensation. The incident proves that 
ijÉrah is known and allowed. This is because ijÉrah is a necessity 
for mankind and helps in maintaining good social relations among 
people (al-QurÏubī, 1985: 13/271). 
As for the Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW), it is reported that the 
Prophet (SAW) said: “Give the worker his wage before his sweat 
dries” (Ibn MÉjah, n.d.: 3/397, no. 2443). In this ÍadÊth, the Prophet 
(SAW) commands payment of the recompense immediately after the 
work is finished. If ijÉrah was not permissible, he would not have 
commanded payment, immediate or otherwise.
It is also reported that when the Prophet (SAW) instructed Abū 
Bakr to make preparations to emigrate from Makkah to Madīnah, Abū 
Bakr hired a guide from BanÊ al-Dayl to lead them on their journey. 
The Prophet (SAW) also quoted Allah (SWT) as saying: “There 
are three people whose enemy I shall be on the Day of Judgment; 
one of them is a man who hired a worker to carry out some work for 
him but did not give him his wage” (al-BukhÉrÊ, 1400 AH : 2/133, 
no. 2270). This is explicit evidence for the permissibility of ijārah 
because if the contract was not legal, Allah (SWT) would not threaten 
those who withhold payment of the recompense with His enmity on 
the Day of Recompense. 
The evidence for salam is also supportive of the legality of 
AIMAD because scholars like al-BahËtÊ (1996: 2/251), Ibn MufliÍ 
(2003: 7/160) and al-NawawÊ (2003: 4/250) referred AIMAD to 
the salam contract. With regard to the evidence from the QurÒÉn on 
salam, Allah (SWT) says: 
“O you who believe! When you deal with one another in 
transactions involving future obligations for a fixed term, 
reduce them to writing” [al-Baqarah: 282].  
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The phrase “transactions involving future obligations” in the context 
of the above verse also includes the salam contract in which delivery 
of the subject matter occurs in the future. Ibn ÑAbbÉs referred to this 
verse when explaining the salam contract (Ibn Kathīr, 1999: 1/722). 
As the verse talks about future obligations of any transaction, it 
encompasses AIMAD as well, except when it includes any prohibited 
element.  
Regarding the Sunnah, the Prophet (SAW) said:
Whoever wishes to enter into a contract of salam, he must 
effect the salam according to specified measure or specified 
weight and a specified date of delivery (al-BukhÉrÊ, 1400 
AH, No. 2240). 
Since the salam contract is a forward sale, it entails future obligation. 
Likewise, AIMAD entails a future obligation similar to that of salam 
because it is the salam of usufruct. 
With regard to the ijmÉÑ on the validity of ijÉrah and salam, there 
has been agreement among the scholars from the time of the SaÍÉbah 
(Companions) to this day on the permissibility of ijÉrah (Ibn Qudāmah, 
1997: 8/6; al-ZuÍaylÊ, 1985: 4/598) and of salam (al-ZaylaÑÊ, 1985: 
4/110), and none violated this consensus except ÑAbd al-RaÍmān ibn 
al-AÎamm (d. 279 H), who disagreed to the consensus on ijÉrah, and 
SaÑÊd ibn al-Musayyab (d. 94 H), who opposed the consensus on salam, 
as is mentioned by Al-Qurah DÉgÊ (2008). 
With regard to ijÉrah, ÑAbd al-RaÍmÉn ibn al-AÎamm opined 
that it is prohibited due to gharar (uncertainty) as it is a contract 
on usufruct not yet found. However, jurists refuted his argument by 
indicating that gharar shall be ignored here because the contract 
on usufruct is not possible after the existence of the usufruct as it is 
known that usufruct perishes with the passage of time; so a contract 
for usufruct should be concluded before it comes into being—similar 
to a salam contract on assets (al-ZuÍaylÊ, 1985: 4/730). 
It has been reported that SaÑÊd ibn al-Musayyab opposed the 
consensus of the ØaÍÉbah on the legality of salam. Some scholars 
have challenged the authenticity of the attribution of this opinion to 
him as shÉdh (anomalous). Even if it is correct, it is ineffective due to 
the consensus of the ØaÍÉbah before him (al-ÑAssÉf, n.d.: 32). 
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All the proofs mentioned above indicate the legality of AIMAD in 
general because AIMAD is a kind of ijÉrah. AIMAD is no different in 
its rules from the original ijÉrah except that the subject matter herein 
is non-existent or not owned whereas it is a particular existing item 
in the original ijÉrah. Based on the above discussion, it can be said 
that as long as ijÉrah is permissible in SharÊÑah, its modes are also 
permissible while fulfilling their respective conditions and being kept 
within the parameters established by the scholars. In addition, as long 
as it is similar to the salam contract according to some scholars, its 
legality is also derived from the proofs of salam. 
The above discussion was on general evidence for the legality of 
AIMAD. The next discussion will be on scholarly opinion about its 
legality.
b. Opinions of Early Scholars on the Legality of AIMAD 
Scholars of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence agreed 
on the legality of AIMAD. However, although ×anbalÊ, MÉlikÊ and 
ShāfiÑī scholars allowed it on the basis of the general evidence for 
ijārah, ×anafī scholars allowed it on the basis of istiÍsān (juristic 
preference).2  
i. The ×anafī School of Law
Al-KÉsÉnÊ (1982: 4/233) says: 
If the ijÉrah is effected for a pack-animal (dÉbbah) stipulated 
by specifications and the pack-animal is delivered to the 
mustaÒjir (lessee) and it dies after he received it, the ijÉrah 
will not be void. The muÒajjir (lessor) must replace it with 
another one for the lessee because the subject matter of the 
contract is not the particular animal which died. The contract 
is executed on the usufruct with future obligation and the 
pack-animal is not particularized.
2 IstiÍsÉn is a method of exercising personal opinion in order to avoid any rigidity and 
unfairness that might result from the literal enforcement of the existing law (Kamali, 
2007: 218). 
 Dispute Over the Legality of Al-IjÉrah Al-MawÎËfah FÊ Al-Dhimmah:
A Survey of FiqhÊ Opinions 
60 ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 7 • Issue 1 • 2015
In this passage, ‘pack-animal stipulated by specifications’ indicates 
that the type of ijÉrah here is AIMAD because the subject matter, 
the animal, is not a particular one; rather, it is specified with some 
specific features. 
ii. The MÉlikÊ School of Law
Ibn Juzay al-Kalbī (741 AH: 182), in al-QawÉnīn al-Fiqhiyyah, says: 
Leases of boats and riding animals (dÉbbah) are of two types: a lease 
that particularizes a specific animal or a specific boat, and a lease in 
liability. For example, if somebody says, ‘I will hire an animal or a 
boat from you’ it is allowed to pay the compensation on the spot or on 
credit in both leases, and if the animal dies, the lease will be revoked. 
If the animal is in liability and not particularized, the lessor must 
replace it with another animal.
Replacing the dead animal with a new one is a condition of 
AIMAD because it is the salam of usufruct. 
iii. The ShÉfiÑÊ School of Law
Al-Minhājī (1996) in his book ‘The Essentials of Contracts and 
Conditions’ mentions two types of ijÉrah: 
i. IjÉrah of a tangible asset, such as rental of real estate or of a 
specific animal (or vehicle) to ride or carry goods, or the renting 
out of a particular person’s service to sew. 
ii. IjÉrah of an assigned liability (AIMAD) such as rental of a 
car of certain specifications or guaranteeing someone on the 
performance of a service like sewing or construction. 
If a person says: ‘I have employed you to do such-and-such,’ does it 
mean particularized ijÉrah or the commissioning of liability? There 
are two opinions regarding this question. The more obvious of the 
two is that it is particularized ijÉrah (al-MinhÉjÊ, 1996: 1/360). It is 
considered as such because the hirer has identified the worker he 
expects to produce the output.  
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iv. The ×anbalÊ School of Law
In al-FurūÑ, Ibn MufliÍ (2003) classifies ijÉrah into three types:  
i. IjÉrah of a corporeal asset which is similar to an item for sale. 
This is revocable if its future usufruct is impaired at the inception 
(of the contract) or while part of the period remains. 
ii. IjÉrah as a liability to provide a generic item meeting certain 
specifications. For this, the specifications of salam must be 
fulfilled and should it be usurped or destroyed or a defect appear 
in it, a substitute is mandatory. However, if it becomes impossible 
to replace it, the hirer has the option to annul the contract. It 
automatically dissolves with the passage of [the appointed] time 
if its period of validity has been fixed. 
iii. A forward contract for a designated benefit, like tailoring, for 
which liability is undertaken. [The liability] must be precisely 
determined so as to eliminate potential conflict (Ibn MufliÍ, 
2003: 4/440- 441).
All these texts of classical Islamic Jurisprudence prove that the early 
Islamic scholars unanimously agreed on the legality of AIMAD. 
c. Opinions of Contemporary Scholars on the
Legality of AIMAD 
Contemporary scholars such as al-BËÏÊ (2007: 8), AbË Ghuddah 
(2007: 89), al-Qurah DÉghÊ (2008: 14), NazÊh ×ammÉd (2007: 33), 
YËsuf al-ShubaylÊ (2012: 4) and ×Émid MÊrah (2012: 8), among 
others, allow AIMAD. Throughout the review of contemporary 
writings, the researcher could not find any dispute among them on the 
legality of AIMAD. However, while dealing with the classical texts, 
they differ in their approaches on the opinions of classical fuqahÉ as 
to whether the classical fuqahÉ allowed AIMAD unanimously or not. 
Some contemporary scholars say that there was dispute among the 
classical fuqahÉ on the legality of AIMAD, whereas others opine that 
there was consensus among the classical fuqahÉ.     
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 i. The Dispute as Understood by
Some Contemporary Scholars and Its Refutation
In this section, we will discuss whether there was any dispute among 
classical fuqahÉ on the legality of AIMAD as understood by some 
contemporary scholars and will refute if there was any misattribution 
to classical scholars. NazÊh ×ammÉd (2007) and AÍmad NaÎÎār 
(2009) mention disagreement among the four classical schools of 
Islamic Jurisprudence on the legality of AIMAD and attribute the 
view of illegality to the ×anafī School. AÍmad NaÎÎār (2009: 102-
103) states the following, although he does not mention any proof in 
support of his assertion: 
The fuqahÉ differed on the legality of al-ijÉrah al-mawÎËfah 
fÊ al-dhimmah. ×anafÊ scholars prohibit leasing of usufruct of 
objects which are stipulated in liability and they require the 
leasing object to be particularized whereas the majority of the 
fuqahÉ, comprising the MÉlikÊs, ShÉfiÑÊs and ×anbalÊs, allow 
leasing of an object stipulated in liability and they considered 
it a type of salam in usufruct. 
As for Abū Ghuddah (2007: 73), he does not mention the ×anafi 
view with regard to AIMAD at all. While discussing the legality of 
AIMAD, he states: 
There is no need to mention the evidence for the legality of 
ijÉrah muÑayyanah (particularized) because it is well known. 
As for al-ijÉrah al-mawÎËfah fÊ al-dhimmah (AIMAD), 
which ShāfiÑÊ and ×anbalÊ scholars consider valid, they did 
not provide proofs to support its legality in particular.
This statement indicates that AbË Ghuddah (2007) has a similar 
approach to NazÊh ×ammÉd (2007) and AÍmad NaÎÎÉr  (2009). He 
also discusses the MÉlikÊ viewpoint on some issues pertaining to 
AIMAD, but he does not discuss the ×anafÊ view at all, because he 
focuses only on those scholars who allow it.  
NazÊh ×ammÉd (2007) declares that the fuqahÉ varied in their 
opinions on the legality of ijÉrah al-dhimmah (lease in liability). 
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The majority of the fuqahÉ, including MÉlikÊ, ShāfiÑÊ and ×anbalÊ, 
held the view of its legality; whereas the ×anafÊ scholars preferred 
the opinion that it is not permissible at all. This is because the 
particularization of the leased item is one of the conditions for the 
validity of the ijÉrah contract. Hence, any contract of the usufruct 
stipulated in liability which does not depend on any particular object 
is not allowed. In order to prove this view, NazÊh ×ammÉd (2007) 
refers to Majallat al-AÍkÉm al-ÑAdliyyah. It is mentioned therein that 
“particularization of the leased item is required. Therefore, leasing 
one of two shops is not allowed unless one of them is particularized 
or specified” (Majallat al-AÍkÉm al-ÑAdliyyah, 1302 AH: 75, clause 
449). In addition, it is mentioned in Murshid al-×ayrÉn (clause 
580) that “consent of both contracting parties and knowledge of the 
usufruct are made conditions for the legality of ijārah” (Murshid al-
×ayrÉn ilā MaÑrifat AÍwal al-InsÉn, 1909: 146). Moreover, there is 
a principle in the ×anafÊ School that “usufruct is not considered as a 
valuable asset” (al-SarakhsÊ, 2009: 15/137). Based on these texts, he 
concludes that ×anafÊ scholars do not allow AIMAD (×ammÉd, 2007: 
328). His interpretation of these texts could be refuted as follows.
With regard to the Majallat al-AÍkÉm al-ÑAdliyyah (1302 H), 
clause 449 means that the subject matter of the contract of hire must be 
specified. Consequently, if one of two shops is let out on hire without 
the particular shop in question being specified, and the lessee is given 
an option as to which one he will take, such a contract is considered 
invalid. Actually, this clause explains that the ×anafī School making 
one of two objects the source of the contracted usufruct without any 
specification or any distinction in the case of ijÉrah muÑayyanah. 
This case includes the jahÉlah (lack of information) and gharar 
(ambiguity and uncertainty) that must be removed from the subject 
matter in ijÉrah muÑayyanah. It is not related to the subject matter 
of AIMAD wherein gharar is removed by stipulating the necessary 
traits of the object. Since the counter-value will differ according to 
the qualities of the usufruct, it should be stipulated by specifications 
(×āmid Mīrah, 2012: 9). The classical books of the ×anafÊ School 
denoted the legality of this type of ijÉrah; even Majallat al-AÍkÉm 
al-ÑAdliyyah itself contains several clauses that explicitly prove the 
legality of AIMAD; such as clauses 466, 538, 540 and 541. Clause 
540, for example, states: 
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If a bargain has been agreed to carry something to a certain 
place, and the animal becomes fatigued and stops on the way, 
the owner of the animal is bound to transfer such load onto 
another animal to carry it to the place in question (Majallat, 
1302 H: 85, clause 540).   
As for the clause of Murshid al-×ayrÉn, clause 580 means that 
consent of the two contracting parties, particularization of the subject 
matter, and knowledge of the usufruct in the way that does not lead 
to conflict are all required for the legality of AIMAD. The discussion 
on the clause of Murshid al-×ayrÉn is exactly the same as that in 
the Majallah. In addition, there are also several clauses mentioned in 
Murshid al-×ayrÉn itself that prove the legality of AIMAD such as 
clauses 580, 582, 598 and 616. Clause 598 states: “if the mustaÒjir 
hires a riding animal not in particular (to carry his luggage to a 
specific place), he has the right to demand another animal” (Murshid 
al-×ayrÉn, MÉddah, 1909 AH: 152). The phrase ‘a riding animal not 
in particular’ means any animal stipulated by specifications. 
Regarding the principle of the ×anafÊ School which states 
that usufruct is not considered property, those who attributed the 
prohibition of AIMAD to the ×anafÊ School derived the prohibition 
of usufruct stipulated in liability by specifications from this principle. 
Nevertheless, not all ×anafÊ scholars supported the principle. There 
are two views in the texts of the ×anafÊ School regarding whether 
usufruct is considered an asset or not. For example, al-SarakhsÊ (2009: 
15/137) said: “This is according to the opinion which considers 
usufruct an asset, although it is not a particular object…while 
according to the [other] opinion, which does not consider usufruct 
an asset...” This text signifies that usufruct is considered an asset 
to al-SarakhsÊ. However, when an asset is used, it generally means 
an object. Ibn MÉzah (2004: 4/11) reported: “If anybody leases and 
hires, this is allowed, because ijÉrah is a business. Business is an 
exchange of one asset for another asset and usufruct is an asset.” 
×Émid MÊrah (2012) quotes Ibn Nujaym (n.d.: 2/217) on the contrary 
declaring:
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 ُﺮَﺧ ﱠُﺪﻳَو ُلﱠﻮَﻤَُﺘـﻳ ﺎﻣ—ِلﻮُﺻُْﻷا ُﻞْﻫَأ ِﻪِﺑ َحﱠﺮَﺻ ﺎﻤﻛ—ُلﺎَﻤْﻟاَو
 ...ِﻊِﻓﺎَﻨَﻤْﻟا ُﻚﻴِْﻠَﲤ ََجﺮَﺨَﻓ ،ِنﺎَﻴْﻋَْﻷِﺎﺑ ﱞصﺎَﺧ ﻮﻫو ،ِﺔَﺟﺎَﺤِْﻠﻟ
.ﺔَﻣﱢﻮََﻘـﺘُﻣ ٍْﲔَﻌِﺑ ْﺖَﺴَْﻴﻟ َﺔَﻌَْﻔـﻨَﻤْﻟا ﱠنَِﻷ
An asset, in the view of usūl scholars, is something that 
has financial value and can be saved for [future] need. This 
applies to tangible objects in particular; thus, the transfer of 
ownership of usufruct is excluded…because usufruct is not a 
tangible object to which a value can be attached.
By comparing these three texts, it can be concluded that ×anafÊ 
scholars considered the basic rule for usufruct to be that it is a non-
valuable asset, but they excluded the usufruct of the ijÉrah contract 
(from being a valueless asset) regardless of whether it is ijÉrah of a 
particular object or usufruct in liability. In this case, they considered 
it a valuable asset as an exception and khilÉf al-qiyÉs (contrary to 
analogical reasoning) (×Émid MÊrah, 2012: 9). This view is supported 
by another fact that many ×anafÊ scholars such as al-SamarqandÊ 
(1984: 2/361), Ibn MÉzah (2004: 7/509) and al-HumÉm (2000: 
4/522), among others, explicitly reported the legality of AIMAD. 
ii. Consensus as Understood by Other Contemporary Scholars
Monzer QaÍf (2010), SÉmÊ al-Suwaylem (2010), ×Émid MÊrah 
(2012) and YËsuf al-ShubaylÊ (2012), among others, stated that there 
is consensus among early fuqahÉ on the legality of AIMAD. For 
example, Monzer QaÍf (2010: 41) states: 
The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence agreed on the 
permissibility of AIMAD, and they do not look at the 
existence of the object as a condition at the time the contract 
is concluded, because it is similar to salam in terms of 
obligation on the basis that leasing a specific object attaches 
to the future date.
In this statement, Monzer QaÍf reports the permissibility of AIMAD 
from the ×anafi School as well. 
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SÉmÊ al-Suwaylem (2010) comments, while discussing its legality 
according to the ×anafÊ School, that there is no deferment of leased 
object in this type of ijÉrah (AIMAD); rather, there is guarantee 
to change the object if it perishes (×Émid MÊrah, 2012: 8). In this 
statement SÉmÊ al-Suwaylem (2010) is focusing on the strength of 
AIMAD rather than its legality by highlighting the guaranty aspect in 
case of any damage to the object. 
×Émid MÊrah (2012: 8) states:
The ruling on issuance of Øukūk for the usufruct of objects 
stipulated in obligation depends mainly on the resolution of 
the fuqahā with regard to ijārah of the usufruct of objects 
as stipulated in obligation; which the four schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence (×anafÊ, MÉlikÊ, ShafiÑÊ, and ×anbalÊ) 
generally agree upon. 
In this statement, ×Émid MÊrah (2012) explicitly mentions a general 
agreement of the four schools on the legality of AIMAD. As long 
as there is no specific evidence or text conflicting with this general 
statement, AIMAD should be considered allowed by all the scholars 
including the ×anafÊs. 
YËsuf al-ShubaylÊ (2012: 4) also made a similar statement: 
All scholars generally opined that ijÉrah is permitted if 
either the subject matter is a particular item (particularized) 
or is described as a liability (forward). The attribution of 
prohibition of AIMAD to the ×anafÊ scholars is inaccurate; 
rather, the views mentioned in their classical books prove its 
legality.
iii. The Preponderant View of Classical FuqahÉ
The preferred view on the notions of classical scholars on the legality 
of AIMAD is that there is consensus among the four Sunni schools 
on its legality. In fact, the ×anafÊ School seemed to be more flexible 
in this regard because the scholars did not require immediate payment 
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of the compensation before a period of time passes unlike the other 
schools which required immediate payment (AbË Ghuddah, 2007: 
86; Monzer QaÍf, 2010: 4/69). 
VI. CONTEMPORARY RESOLUTIONS ON AIMAD
a. Resolutions of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)
AAOIFI referred to the AIMAD contract and permitted delayed 
payment in it, as mentioned in its SharÊÑah Standard No. 9 pertaining 
to ijÉrah and ijÉrah muntahiyah bi al-tamlÊk (ijÉrah terminated at 
ownership), Article 3, Point 5.
AAOIFI Article: An ijÉrah contract may be executed for an asset 
undertaken by the lessor to be delivered to the lessee according to 
accurate specifications, even if the asset so described is not owned by 
the lessor. In this case, an agreement is reached to make the described 
asset available during the duration of the contract, giving the lessor 
the opportunity to acquire or to produce it. It is not a requirement 
of this lease that the rental should be paid in advance as long as the 
lease is not executed according to the contract of salam (or salaf). If 
the lessee receives an asset that does not conform to the description, 
he is entitled to reject it and demand an asset that conforms to the 
description (AAOIFI, Shari’ah Standard No. 9, p. 142).        
   
Discussion on the AAOIFI Article: It is noted that the AAOIFI 
standard differentiates on the basis of the wording of the contract; 
delayed payment is allowed if the contract is concluded by the 
wording of ijÉrah and its derivatives, whereas advance payment is 
mandatory if the contract is executed by the wording of salam or 
salaf. This differentiation does not conform to the purpose of the 
transaction and the intention of contracting parties. On this point, 
AÍmad NaÎÎār (2009: 107-108) puts forward some observations in 
order to reconcile different opinions regarding advance payment in 
the contract of AIMAD as follows:     
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i. If we consider permissibility of the delayed payment based on the 
wording, then which rules will we apply here? The rules for the 
lease of a particular object or the rules for AIMAD? This makes 
a difference since the rules differ. 
ii. If we consider permissibility of delayed payment, we will be 
involved in the prohibition of initiating the sale of debt for debt 
(al-kÉliÒ bi al-kÉliÒ).  
iii. The apparent meaning of the consideration of wording is 
that the consideration should be based on the intention of 
the contracting parties and that this should be deduced from 
their wording. However, if this intention is apprehended by 
custom (Ñurf), particularly in contemporary societies that rely 
upon documentation and authentication in order to clarify the 
transactions, that would be more helpful in understanding the 
transaction and the purpose of the contracting parties.
AÍmad NaÎÎÉr (2009) raises these issues and calls for further research 
to settle them. 
With regard to the above resolution of AAOIFI, this paper 
has already discussed that delayed payment is allowed in AIMAD 
regardless of whether the contract is executed by the wording of 
ijÉrah or salam/salaf. 
Second, in response to the observation of AÍmad NaÎÎÉr (2009), it 
can be stated that transactions do not differ on the basis of the wording 
of the contract because al-Ñibrah (decisive factor) is not the wording 
but the meanings and objectives of the contract. The intention of the 
contracting parties may remain the same even if the wording of the 
contract differs. In addition, the argument for the impermissibility 
of sale of debt for debt is weak because the ÍadÊth narrated is not 
authentic and no consensus is found in this regard (AÍmad NaÎÎÉr, 
2009: 83).      
b. Resolutions of Bank Negara Malaysia 
The SharÊÑah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) refers to the application of AIMAD for home financing under 
construction, and its use as a sub-contract of the hybrid financial 
product in Part 1 under SharÊÑah contracts and in Part 3 under hybrid 
products.     
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Resolutions: 
1. The SAC, in its 68th meeting dated 24 May 2007, has resolved that 
the application of ijārah mawÎūfah fī al-dhimmah in financing 
for house under construction using mushārakah mutanÉqiÎah 
contract is permissible (BNM, 2010: 16).   
2. The SAC, in its 68th meeting dated 24 May 2007, has resolved 
that the proposed house financing product based on istiÎnÉÑ 
muwÉzī, ijÉrah mawÎūfah fī al-dhimmah and ijārah muntahiyah 
bi al-tamlīk is permissible (BNM, 2010: 169).  
Discussion on the Resolutions: In resolution (1), the SAC was asked 
to decide whether the application of AIMAD as a sub-contract in the 
product of home financing based on mushÉrakah mutanÉqiÎah is 
permissible. In resolution (2), the SAC was asked to decide whether 
the financing product for a house under construction based on these 
three contracts is permissible. However, the SAC does not mention 
this financing product based on mushÉrakah mutanÉqiÎah partnership 
(MMP) specifically; rather, the SAC mentions the product based on 
a hybrid mode compounded from the three contracts. The SAC’s 
resolution also does not address some issues that might arise from 
this home financing product based on the hybrid mode, such as what 
will happen in the event of non-completion of the house? Who will 
be liable for the damage during construction? What will happen to the 
deposit paid by the customer?
VII. TAKYĪF FIQHĪ (FIQH CHARACTERIZATION)
OF AIMAD
The scholars differed in terms of the takyīf fiqhī of AIMAD. There are 
two opinions regarding this: 
1. AIMAD is similar to salam because the subject matter in both 
AIMAD and salam is stipulated in liability. ShafiÑÊ and ×anbalī 
scholars preferred this opinion. According to them, the salam 
contract is for stipulated objects whereas AIMAD is for stipulated 
usufruct (BNM, 2010: 2/251). Thus, they looked at AIMAD as 
the salam of usufruct and referred its legality to the evidence for 
salam (al-Bahūtī, 1996: 4/28, 39; Abū Ghuddah, 2007: 71, 73). 
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They also suggested that the conditions for AIMAD should be 
exactly the same as the conditions of salam.
2. Others such as ×anafÊ scholars considered AIMAD similar 
to ijārah and that makes it in general a kind of ijārah. Based 
on this point of view, ×anafÊ scholars did not differentiate 
between AIMAD and ijÉrah muÑayyanah (particularized) while 
discussing its legality. They discussed the legality of ijārah in 
general and mentioned different forms of ijārah, one of them 
being AIMAD. Thus, they looked at it as ijÉrah of usufruct and 
referred its legality to the evidence of the original ijārah. Hence, 
they applied the conditions of original ijÉrah in AIMAD. They 
are concerned about the wording of ijÉrah and any other words 
similar to it (Abū Ghuddah, 2007: 73-74).
Preponderant View:
Regarding the rules of AIMAD, the second view could be preferable. 
The reasons for this preference are as follows:  
i. Most of the scholars opined that AIMAD is executed by the 
wording of ijÉrah in addition to the wording of salam and salaf. 
If it is not a kind of ijÉrah, this wording cannot be used to execute 
the contract. However, if the same is applicable with regard to 
salam and salaf, this is because of the similarity between AIMAD 
and salam in terms of their execution procedure, albeit they are 
different in terms of the basic contract. This is why the classical 
fuqahā said that it must fulfill the Îifāt (qualities/ conditions) of 
salam, but they did not exclude it from being ijÉrah (al-Bahūtī, 
1996: 1/360, 2/251).   
ii. Some ×anbalÊ scholars opined that spot payment is not necessary 
in AIMAD if it is executed by the wording of ijÉrah. If AIMAD 
is not a kind of ijÉrah, it cannot be executed by such wording in 
the first place. In addition, the ruling of the same contract cannot 
be different merely based on the wording. 
iii. Most of the classical scholars discussed AIMAD in the chapter of 
ijÉrah, not in the chapter of salam. 
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VIII. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Even though the application of AIMAD has expanded to include 
some new types of transactions, its use has been limited because 
there is dispute among scholars with regard to the legality of AIMAD 
as some contemporary scholars mentioned disagreement among the 
early Muslim scholars thereon and attributed its prohibition to the 
×anafÊ School. This paper has examined the legality of AIMAD, and 
it notes that the classical scholars of the four Sunni schools of Islamic 
law unanimously agreed on its legality. Some contemporary scholars 
have confusingly mentioned a dispute in this regard by attributing the 
prohibition of AIMAD to the ×anafÊ School. This attribution is not 
correct as proven by many classical texts of the ×anafÊ School. 
With this finding, it is hoped that this paper will contribute 
towards promoting the innovation of new types of financial products 
based on AIMAD and in expanding its application to other types 
of financial services in the future. Moreover, by clearing up this 
misunderstanding, the paper attempts to increase public confidence 
in Islamic banking products based on the concept of AIMAD. 
Nonetheless, this paper focuses only on the dispute of scholars 
with regard to the legality of AIMAD as reported by some 
contemporary scholars. There are some other related issues which 
are still not addressed—such as delayed payment and whether 
usufruct is a valuable asset. As such, further research is required so 
as to remove disputes and facilitate the application of this principle 
in the development of financial products. It is also recommended to 
carry out research on hybrid modes of financial services wherein the 
concept of AIMAD is already used such as mushÉrakah mutanÉqiÎah 
partnership (MMP), istisnÉÑ and parallel istisnÉÑ in order to investigate 
their validity.
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